Engaging Empire's Stinking Remnants

“Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbor.  Every man’s hand is against the other, and all are against the stranger.”  
Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand [Pakistan] Field Force (1898)

“We come from the desert; our culture is for revenge.”
 Amer al-Khuzaie, Iraqi Adviser on Reconciliation, New York Times,  Sept. 3, 2014

North Africa/Middle East-Political
cia.gov

Debate over arming moderate Syrian rebels and bombing the Islamic State inside Syria has heated up, leaving a friend to question how to distinguish moderate from “immoderate” rebels and, in the case of Iraq and Syria, where one country ends and the other begins. All this is enough to make one’s hair hurt.  But a couple of related examples from Africa and the Middle East might help explain why this situation is so vexing. 

The first example concerns current political boundaries in these regions, practically all of which were drawn by European powers:  in Africa beginning in 1884-5, and for the Middle East during World War I.  In Europe’s international reckoning, both regions were political black holes ruled by no one.   As such, these new political boundaries were, and remain, based solely on the Western concept of the 17th century Westphalian state:  a sovereign entity where solid boundaries separate domestic from international arenas.  

https://en.wiktionary.org/
wiki/File:Color_circle_
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Unfortunately, the colonized never heard of the Westphalian state and would have found it irrelevant in any case.  For example, the boundaries—if one can even call them that—of many traditional African and Middle Eastern political entities states reflected a ruler’s power as it waxed in the capital and waned into the hinterlands, in the same way one color gradually blends into another on a color wheel.  Think spheres of influence vs. solid lines on a map. 

Of course few 19th-20th century European diplomats had any idea of the dynamics of African and Middle Eastern political systems (Lawrence of Arabia was a one-off, and a military guy to boot.)  The result is that Western pseudo-states abound within such lines in the sand, with various groups in a winner-take-all scrum for colonial and foreign aid, jobs, roads, clinics, schools, wells, money and power. Today’s poster children for this plight?  Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan and (of course) Iraq, just to name a few.  States by “diplomatic courtesy,” one observer called such entities.  Empire’s corpses that “stink as nothing else,” in the words of another.

North Africa/Middle East-Geographic
http://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/transit/TV2004/Earth-Egress1a.JPG

A lesser known but more important example also reflects the disconnect between political cultures of the west and these imperial holdings.  This is most apparent along the the hot, arid ecozone that runs across Africa from the Mediterranean Sea south through the Sahel (the “shore” between the southern Sahara and the savanna), and from the Saudi Peninsula to Pakistan.  

Beja Nomads, NE Africa

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:

Bedscha.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Bedscha.jpg  

Original uploader was Nikswieweg at de.wikipedia 

(Original text : Klaus Polak, Pseudonym Nikswieweg) 

Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 

via Wikimedia Commons 

For communities in these areas, movement is essential for survival, and the borders that matter are not European-drawn lines on a map.  Rather they are control over kinship-based alliances that allow access to water, grazing and trade goods, and that change with the vagaries of rainfall patterns.  These kin groups (nuclear and extended families, clans, lineages) separate during rainy seasons to graze their herds, and merge during dry seasons (not always with the same groups) around water holes, oases, and river beds.  Fission and fusion are constant.

The upshot is that there’s no permanent boundary between internal (domestic) and external (foreign) affairs here, no “state” in the western concept.  Even more, as the composition of these kin groups changes, so do their politics.  Alliances among the groups’ segments, or branches, are situational and always shifting, and there is no permanent political “office” to regulate disputes. Since resources are scarce, intra- and inter-clan fighting is endemic.  Raiding is a well-established activity.  In these so-called stateless or segmentary societies, government is by arbitration, not command. No wonder the British, French and Italian colonial rulers found such groups difficult to deal with, let alone conquer and govern.  The old saw “take me to your leader” doesn’t really work.

Balanced Opposition

A dispute between P and his brother (not shown), 
or between Q and his brother (not shown), 

will remain in their respective nuclear families.  

But if P quarrels with cousin 

Q, their respective segments L and M 

will fight, and so on up the line:  

if the lineage B and C fight, 

the members of each segment will become involved.

Order in this complex, ever changing milieu is maintained by a balance of power among kin groups, what anthropologist Phil Salzman (Culture and Conflict in the Middle East, 2008) calls “balanced opposition.”  Whatever the size of the foe, an  equivalent group has one’s back.  A desert proverb puts it thus:  "I against my brother;  I and my brother against my cousin; I and my brother and my cousin against the world.”  

Two other values are embedded in this cultural DNA.  The first is individual honor.  One must be willing to fight and die for one’s kin, because one may need them to fight and die for you.  The second is deterrence.  One has to be willing to inflict violence; friend and foe must understand this. Perceptions of weakness only invite greater mayhem.  If you draw a red line, make sure you’ll back it up; segmentary societies know full well the implications of Napoleon’s maxim  “If you’re going to take Vienna, take Vienna.”   And results matter:  As Salzman puts it, “…attempts do not bring honor.  Success brings honor.  Winners gain honor; losers lose honor.” 

Bedouin Family, Oman

"Bedouin family-Wahiba Sands" by Tanenhaus from Brooklyn - 

Bedouin family, Wahiba Sands. Licensed under Creative Commons 

Attribution 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons - 

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File

:Bedouin_family-Wahiba_Sands

.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Bedouin_family-Wahiba_Sands.jpg

Such values still pervade sedentary and urban populations according to Salzman, and he cites compelling examples, such as the persistence of traditional desert life as the model to emulate; the memory of Islam’s “Golden Age” when nomads spearheaded Islam’s spread across North Africa and the Middle East; the continuation of lineage feuds in otherwise urbanized and modern areas.  It helps to remember that the Sunni-Shia divide, which gets all the attention these days, originated between two lineages in Mecca.  

Seen from this down-to-earth perspective, Islam is but an overlay to a far deeper and more intense dynamic. Religion is one—but only one—manifestation of culture.  Tough physical environments shaped strict and complex codes of behavior in these regions, and those codes endure. 

Given all this, it shouldn’t surprise that political artifice reigns supreme in “failed states” like Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Somalia. Yet, what really failed is the western concept of “state” as imposed on segmentary societies in Africa and the Middle East. “Tribe to nation” and “nation-building” are nice sounding but empty tropes.  And so we have, and will continue to have, the likes of Boko Haram, Séléka, al Shabaab, al Qaeda, al Nusra, and ISIS filling this void of Western political ineptness and intellectual myopia.

Oasis, Hoggar Mts, southern Algeria
"Hoggar8" by Bertrand Devouard ou Florence Devouard
Licensed under Creative CommonsShare Alike 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons -

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Unfortunately, First World countries, buffered from the effects of such Third World environments, and glued to the paradigm of the sovereign state with its solid, international-domestic boundaries, just don’t get it. Moderate rebels?  Immoderate rebels? States and borders?  Good luck with all that.  Rather:  No permanent friends; no permanent enemies; just permanent interests.  Now, there’s a concept everyone can understand.  

And maybe everyone's hair will stop hurting, if just a bit.

Slavery's Supply Side

“.…90 percent of those shipped to the New World were enslaved by Africans and then sold to European traders. The sad truth is that without complex business partnerships between African elites and   European traders and commercial agents, the slave trade to the New World would have been impossible, at least on the scale it occurred.”

Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Director, Hutchins Center for African and African American History, Harvard University, “Ending the Slavery-Blame Game,” New York Times, April 23, 2010

One question has always popped up during class discussions of the Atlantic slave trade:  “Why would black Africans sell their own people to whites?” 

The simple answer is that black Africans did not sell “their own people” to white slavers.  Any modern African history textbook highlights diversity as the essence of African societies and cultures.  For example, Africa is one of the world’s most linguistically rich continents with about 2,000 indigenous languages, and the above question is like saying “Do you speak African?” 

A more complex answer lies in African economic geography and history.  Historian John Thornton documented how sub-Saharan Africa’s massive size but largely infertile soils made slaves the primary income-producing commodity.  In this environment, extensive farming was critical—i.e., farming large and larger land areas was a principal means of increasing food production.  This in turn demanded plentiful labor, free or otherwise. Slaves were thus valuable income-producers.  Their owners, whether political entities or private entrepreneurs, sold slaves to each other and anyone else—Arabs, Europeans, Americans—for luxury and prestige items, thus increasing their social and political status. 

The West African kingdom of Ashanti (or Asante, in modern Ghana) is a good example of this process.   Ashanti had its roots in the 15th-16th century.  New York University Philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, a native of modern Ghana, noted that the founding and consolidation of West African states like Ashanti was based largely on “involuntary labor.” As the kingdom grew more powerful, the Ashanti royal family established a monopoly over the slave trade, furnishing about one million slaves to the New World in the 18th century alone.   

Captured Africans Taken to the Coast,
Nigeria, 1853; (or), Liberia, 1840  http://hitchcock.itc.virginia.edu/Slavery/

Slavery was thus an integral part of sub-Saharan African societies for centuries before the launch of the trans-Atlantic trade. Hence, white Europeans and Americans found a ready supply of slaves when they arrived seeking New World plantation labor.  To Africans, white slavers were just another bunch of buyers.  

Whites were also subordinate partners in this process.  Geographical, ecological, and political conditions allowed Africans to pull the strings here. Poor harbors and unnavigable rivers relegated buyers to the coast where they had to pay rent and taxes and give gifts to African political elites for the privilege of residence. White buyers lacked resistance to indigenous diseases like yellow fever and malaria.  Mortality rates were very high:  historian Philip Curtin estimated 25% of slave ship crews died on their first trip to Africa.  West Africa became “the white man’s grave.”  Powerful West African kingdoms—Asante, Dahomey, Benin, Oyo and smaller political entities —wanted no one, white or black, to usurp their slave-seller role.  

 Subordinate though they were, New World and European slavers could tap into Africa’s very old, well established, and complex slave-supply system.  African military, organizational and commercial expertise facilitated the acquisition and transport of slaves from the West and Central African interior to coastal buyers—a journey that might involve caravans of hundreds (or more) slaves, over hundreds of miles, and weeks of travel under horrendous circumstances. For example, by the late 18th century at the trade’s height, 88,0000 slaves arrived in the New World annually.  And this number represent 50-60% of those who survived the inland journey to the African coast and the dreaded “Middle Passage” to the New World. 

Such conditions depended on African expertise in a wide range of areas.   How to feed captives during this journey?  How to negotiate tolls with African societies whose land these slave caravans traversed?  How to establish credit and prices with buyers?  How to manage other logistical issues, such as pre-planning arrival times and places? How to manage linguistic, social and cross-cultural issues between black sellers and white buyers? How to do this within the context of changing political and economic conditions on both sides of the Atlantic?  

Capture and Coffle of Enslaved Africans,
Angola, 1786-87   http://hitchcock.itc.virginia.edu/Slavery/

In sum, this was not some “primitive” African undertaking.  It was a well-oiled mechanism that provided some 11 million slaves to the New World. It required good race relations between African sellers and white buyers.

How prominent is this supply-side story in American popular culture? Harvard’s Henry Louis Gates Jr. offers a glimpse in his PBS series “Wonders of the African World.”  During a tour of southern Ghana’s Elmina slave holding pen (an “Auschwitz” in Gates’s words) the Ghanaian guide notes that Africans did the raiding and selling of the slaves who ended up in this hell hole. Gates then asks African American visitors about their reactions.  “Were you surprised [to learn that]”?   The response:  “I was surprised to learn that Africans were willing participants in it….surprised and hurt and angry….I had a fantasy about them as ancestors, and your ancestors don’t sell you.  That fantasy was blown away.” 

Aside from such nuggets, slavery’s supply-side history barely makes it into American consciousness.   Rather, films like “12 Years a Slave,” “The Butler” and “Roots” captivate American audiences.  Gates’s series, let alone other academic contributions to this slice of African history, fail to seep into popular culture.

“So what?" one might ask.  "After all, isn’t American racial history dominated by the slave trade’s horrendous demand-side and lingering after effects—Jim Crow, and racial discrimination, the on-going Civil Rights movement?  Aren’t these the issues shaping American identities now?"

It matters very much.  Ignoring slavery’s supply side is mental apartheid.  It denies a crucial piece of African history and identity. Ignoring it means viewing slavery through melanin-tinted lenses, interpreting history, literally, as black and white. Ignoring it limits our understanding of the origin of racism—slavery’s legacy  It strangles the dialogue on how to deal with it.  

Most important, ignoring it prevents us from a deeper understanding of what it means to be human.